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the Soviet Union, the development of the SLCM, and Soviet and
American concepts of verification are presented. The views
of the American arms control and defense communities regarding
the SLCM is discussed in depth, accompanied by a detailed
examination of the various methods which have been proposed
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Senior officers of the United States Navy have argued that
limitations on nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missiles
(SLCMs) should not be included in the current Strategic Arms
Talks (START) because such limitations are unverifiable . This
position has rested on four arguments; (1) conventional
weapons should not be included in a "strategic" arms control
agreement, (2) the small size of the weapon precludes a
confident estimate of the number of SLCMs in the Soviet
inventory, while verification of such an agreement would be
impossible since (3) one cannot distinguish between nuclear
and conventionally armed SLCMs, and (4) it cannot be
guaranteed that conventionally armed SLCMs would not be
surreptitiously converted to nuclear armed ones.
This paper examines the last three of these arguments, all
of which concern the issue of verification. The goal of this
paper is to examine the political and technical verification
issues associated with a possible agreed ban on SLCM
deployment and to show that current verification technology
is sufficient to provide "adequate verification" of a SLCM
arms control agreement. This goal will be accomplished by
first presenting an overview of the arms control relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly
with regard to naval arms control measures. This presentation
is followed by a discussion on the origins of the naval cruise
missile. Next, the impact of SLCMs on American arms control
thinking is discussed, and why SLCMs have become an arms
control "problem." Both American and Soviet concepts of
verification are discussed as is, finally, an in-depth
treatment of the various methods of verification which have
been proposed to underwrite a possible ban on SLCMs. This
paper does not discuss, however, whether or not such an
agreement is in the national interest, nor what would be the
strategic, theater, or tactical impact of such an agreement
were it consummated. It is the author's hope that the reader
emerges from this discussion with a deeper appreciation of the
political and technical issues regarding SLCM verification.
II. ARMS CONTROL BACKGROUND
What forces have motivated the United States and the
Soviet Union to negotiate arms control agreements, especially
nuclear arms control agreements? The answer from the American
perspective can be gleaned from several of the works on arms
control published, in the early 1960s, by members of the so-
called "New Arms Control Consensus" (Lefever, 1962, p. ix)
.
A. MOTIVATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
1 . American Motivations
These "consensus" scholars of arms control justified
their support of U.S. - Soviet arms control measures on three
grounds, the first one being the fear that thermonuclear
weapons might destroy all life on earth. The potential
destructiveness of nuclear warfare was repugnant to these
scholars, who argued ". . . that the destructive power of
nuclear weapons has made war politically obsolete and morally
indefensible. No national interest or purpose, they held can
justify the use of nuclear weapons." (Lefever, 1962, p. x)
Arms control seemed the most promising method to save the
planet from extinction.
A corollary to this view was a concern over the
consequences of a nuclear war, namely the concern that
"civilization, if not man himself, will be eradicated"
(Brennan, 1961, p. 14) . Since the authors assumed that there
was "no defense" (Brennan, 1961, p. 14) against a nuclear
exchange, there was "a growing interest in efforts to make war
less destructive should we fail to prevent it, [which] is
perhaps the central motive behind the present [1963]
disarmament movement" (Lefever, 1962, p. x) . Consequently,
the risk of nuclear war had to be reduced.
Secondly, these scholars believed that the weapons buildup
between the United States and the Soviet Union provided
neither nation with enhanced security. "There is a growing
realization among knowledgeable people that if the arms race
is allowed to continue its accelerating pace, our country will
have less security, not more, with each passing year" was how
one scientific academic stated the argument 1 (Brennan, 1961,
p. 14) . Accordingly, technological breakthroughs on one side
were expected always to be matched by the other, with the
result that each side would be stockpiling as many weapons as
Jerome P. Wiesner was at the time (1963) both Research
Director of Electronics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and the Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology. See Brennan, Notes on Contributors,
p. 475.
possible, and each side would, in effect, be "arms-racing"
against itself without hope of ever breaking the "stalemate."
Thus, the arms race could not contribute to national security;
instead it only made the risks of confrontation and nuclear
weapon use more suicidal. (Brennan, 1961, p. 14)
The third American motivation for arms control evolved
from the desire to "enhance the stability of the political and
military relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Union" (Lefever, 1962, p. xii) . The goal was a reduction in
the risk of confrontation between the two superpowers by means
of so-called "confidence-building measures" (CBMs). These
include various undertakings by both sides to make
"transparent" to the other side the peaceful intent of certain
military actions that might otherwise be misinterpreted or
misunderstood, and possibly trigger an unwanted crisis.
A final important argument on behalf of arms control was
economic, namely the notion that "an arms control measure may
free resources for peaceful uses" (Blacker and Duffy, 1984,
p. 75) yet, when reciprocated by the other side, would still
leave both -- in theory, at least -- with proportionately
equal levels of security. Arms control logic has held that
money not spent on the "non-productive" development,
procurement and life-cycle costs of a weapon can be readily
redirected to the "productive" domestic economy.
The above arguments highlight the broad American
motivations for arms control; some are shared by the Soviet
Union, while others are peculiar to the Soviet perspective.
Unfortunately, the closed nature of Soviet decision-making in
the national security arena makes it very difficult to
confidently identify what factors influenced the Soviet
government to negotiate the first arms control agreements.
2 . Soviet Motivations
One of the most important motivations pushing the
Soviet Union to the negotiating table may have been
ideological in origin. According to a Leninist world view,
the "cause of the amassing of armaments is militarism , " which
is found only in capitalist countries (Vigor, 1986, p. 7,
emphasis in original) . Accordingly, socialist states are said
to only accumulate arms to defend themselves against
capitalist aggression. As capitalist militarism and
aggression threaten the peace of the world, a goal of Soviet
policy is to first slow down, and then stop, the arms race,
eventually proceeding to actual disarmament measures. (Vigor,
1986, pp. 9-10) A recent Soviet work on disarmament argued
that through joint efforts, the world's nation-states must
formulate "a system to ensure a universal, lasting, and just
peace. Thus, disarmament will be a major foreign policy
effort of socialist states" (Potyarkin and Kortunov, 1986, p.
9) .
Regardless whether Marxist-Leninist ideology provides the
fountain-head for the Soviet Union's long range strategic
goals, including arms control, one cannot judge Moscow's
individual decisions on the strength of ideology alone. It
is generally agreed in the West that another reason why the
Soviets engaged in arms control negotiations was the same that
motivated their American contemporaries: recognition of the
destructive nature of thermonuclear war (Dallin and others,
1964, p. 20) . Khrushchev once stated in both public and
private "that the cost of victory in a showdown between
nuclear super-powers would be such as to make the meaning of
Victory' ludicrous" (Dallin and others, 1964, p. 20).
Additionally, this view of nuclear weapons helped, no doubt,
to undermine the Leninist tenet on the "inevitability" of
violent confrontation between capitalist and socialist camps.
"War [could] no longer safely fulfill the socio-political
function of enhancing the conditions" for socialist
revolution. These considerations may have been at the heart
of the strategy of "peaceful coexistence" when first announced
at the Twentieth Party Conference in 1956. (Dallin and others,
1964, pp. 20-21)
The policy of peaceful coexistence was not to end the
conflict between the communist and capitalist camps, but was
aimed instead at redirecting the conflict into other (non-
military) forms while helping to reduce the risk of military
confrontation. This strategy (which is still considered valid
today) helped set the stage for "partial measures," which
"include both measures to regulate the limitation, reduction
or elimination of individual systems and types of weapons as
well as measures to contain and halt the arms race in specific
geographic areas" (Potyarkin and Kortunov, 1986, p. 11).
Although general and complete disarmament remains the
declaratory goal of the Soviet Union, its leadership realized
that this goal could not be achieved instantaneously, with the
stroke of a pen. "Partial measures" provided a path towards
the goal while also helping to reduce the risk of
confrontation between the superpowers.
The economic argument for arms control has also been made
in the Soviet Union, where the potential benefit of reduced
military expenditures might be much greater than in the United
States. Although precise data are impossible to obtain,
estimates have placed Soviet defense spending in the early
1960s at a level between 11.3 and 15 percent of the Soviet
Gross National Product (GNP) . These figures do not far exce^l
the U.S. expenditure of 10.3 percent of GNP on the military
in 1963. Soviet military expenditure, however,
weighs more heavily on the Soviet than the American
economy. Despite its smaller population, the United
States annually produces approximately double the GNP of
the USSR and can thus afford with less strain to spend a
tenth on military affairs (Larson, 1969, pp. 84-85)
.
Thus, the economic incentive for the Soviet interest in arms
control seems self-evident. The nature of the Soviet economy,
however, centrally controlled and command oriented, prevents
the population from applying much influence on central
decision makers. The result is that economic benefits "are
likely to be a reinforcing rather than a compelling" argument
for arms control (Dallin and others, 1964, p. 24). 2
Although the foregoing considerations may provide the
general framework for why the Soviets entered in arms control
negotiations, several Western commentators have also
identified what they believe to have been the immediate
2Since the currently ongoing efforts at economic
perestroika , or restructuring, and qlasnost , or openness,
allow greater communication of economic dissatisfaction from
the "man-in-the-street" to the key leadership, the economic
rationales of arms control have received greater publicity.
Arms control policy, however, as a key component of a national
security and defense strategy, is probably still primarily
guided by military-political rationales.
catalysts for the Soviet decision to go to the negotiating
table. The first one may be, in fact, a "mirror image" of
U.S. thinking, namely the belief that the Soviet leadership
had come to accept the American concept of Mutual Assured
Destruction. This concept holds that deterrence is best
served by "maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable
ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any
aggressor, or combination of aggressors..." (Freedman, 1986,
p. 758) . During the mid-1960s, the then American Secretary
of Defense, Robert S. McNamara effectively translated this
criterion for deterrence into the ability to deliver 400
Equivalent Megatons (EMT) of nuclear explosives on the Soviet
Union's cities and industries (Enthoven and Smith, 1971, pp.
207-208) . It followed that any nuclear capability over this
amount was an excess and thus could (or should) be eliminated
through arms control measures
.
Another argument that has been presented to explain the
Soviet "embrace" of agreed arms controls has been progress,
since the early 1960s, in solving the problem of "intrusive"
verification. With the practical advent of so-called national
technical means of verification, 3 i.e., mainly satellite
3The term "national technical means of verification" was
first used in the SALT I agreement.
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systems, the prospect was opened for ensuring arms control
compliance without the need for intrusive, on-site inspections
and monitorings
.
Being a closed society, the Soviet Union had
consistently rejected agreements which depended upon such
verification procedures. (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
1976, p. 17; Shearer, 1984, p. 33)
Although none of the factors discussed above can capture
the whole of Soviet motivations for entering into arms control
negotiations in the early 1960s, their sum probably covers the
majority of factors that influenced the Soviet leadership'
s
decision making in this regard.
B. OVERVIEW OF US/USSR ARMS CONTROL RELATIONSHIP
Arms control agreements between the United States and the
Soviet Union since the early 1960s may be divided into four
general categories: (1) confidence building measures (CBMs)
,
(2) anti-proliferation measures, (3) technological ceilings,
and (4) stockpile ceilings. Each is described below, along
with specific examples.
1 . Confidence Building Measures
Confidence building measures are designed to lower the
risk of accidental confrontation between states by lessening
the possibility of mutual misunderstanding or
misinterpretation. CBMs can take many forms, but two most
11
visible examples are the Washington-Moscow "hot-line, " and the
requirement for prior notification of large military
exercises
.
The installation, in 1964, of a direct communications
link between the superpowers'" national capitals, the so-called
"hot-line," was one result of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
During the Crisis, both nations were hampered by delays in
communication between the leaderships; at least eight separate
communications paths used have been identified (Allison, 1971,
p. 217) . The hot-line was "designed to allow the superpowers
to clarify their intentions in case of accident,
miscalculation, or misunderstanding and thus prevent an
unintended war" (Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p. 118). Although
the stated purpose of the hot-line is still to help prevent
accidental war, its existence also allows for rapid and
reliable communication between the two governments in
situations not immediately threatening to either superpower.
For example, President Nixon is believed to have used it
during the September - October 1970 unrest in the Middle East
(Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p. 118)
.
The prior notification CBM was a result of the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
signed in Helsinki in 1975. Although the Final Act was not
12
a "treaty" per se , the U.S. government has regarded it as
such. The CBMs incorporated into the Final Act required that
the parties exchange specific kinds of information. Prior
notification is to be given of all major military
maneuvers - those employing over 25,000 troops as well as
smaller exercises whose character or location is judged
by the holder to warrant notice (Blacker and Duffy, 1984,
p. 296) .
2. Anti-Proliferation Measures
The second category of arms control agreements between
states may be called anti-proliferation measures. One of the
stated motives of Soviet arms control policy is the
establishment of "measures to contain and halt the arms race
in specific geographic areas" (Potyarkin and Kortunov, 1986,
p. 11) . The Soviet concept of non-proliferation applies to
weapons as well as to geographic regions, since, claim the
Soviets, the reduction of the global stockpile of weapons is
another step on the road towards the ultimate goal of complete
disarmament. (Potyarkin and Kortunov, 1986, pp. 9-12 inter
alia)
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1967 was the
first proposal in this category to become a ratified treaty.
By its provisions, nuclear weapon states agree not to transfer
nuclear materials to, or encourage the development of, nuclear
weapons by the non-nuclear states. Additionally, the non-
nuclear states who have signed the treaty agree not to attempt
13
to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. (Blacker and Duffy,
1984, p. 393)
Nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) have been proposed
many times for many areas of the globe. "The purpose of a
nuclear free zone is to remove a particular area of the world
from the nuclear arms race (1) by outlawing the introduction
of nuclear weapons into the area and (2) by prohibiting the
use of nuclear weapons against countries within the area"
(Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p. 151) . The only area specifically
embodied in such a treaty is Latin America, so defined as to
include the Caribbean Sea (Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p. 376).
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, while not specifically
mentioning nuclear weapons, states that "Antarctica shall be
used for peaceful purposes only" (Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p.
375) . Additionally, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the
Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 ban nuclear weapons in
space and on the seabed respectively (Blacker and Duffy, 1984,
pp. 121 and 124-125). Thus, non-proliferation agreements may
be seen to comprise two types, those limiting the spread of
nuclear weapons to individual nations and those attempting to






Mutual agreement to deliberately halt or slow down the
acquisition of new weapons technologies may be considered the
third category of arms control in the US/USSR relationship.
This class of agreements attempts to limit the arms race and
create a more stable international environment by limiting or
preventing the development or testing of so-called "de-
stabilizing" weapons technologies. The Limited Test Ban
Treaty of 1963 is one example, and so is the SALT I ban on
nation-wide U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile defense systems.
Discussions on the prohibition of testing of nuclear
weapons had been a continuous facet on the international scene
since 1957, when concerns over radioactive pollution from the
atmospheric testing of weapons "reached a peak" (Blacker and
Duffy, 1984, p. 126). A mutually declared, tripartite
(including the U.S., the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom)
moratorium on atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons was
announced in late 1958, continuing until September 1961, when
the Soviet Union resumed testing. The domestic U.S. political
reaction to the Soviet testing resumption, the increasing
evidence of biological effects caused by nuclear fallout, and
the Cuban Missile Crisis prompted the United States government
to increase its emphasis on achieving at least a partial,
15
i.e., atmospheric, test ban with the Soviets (Blacker and
Duffy, 1984, p. 129) . Eventually, on 5 August 1963, a treaty,
that permitted nuclear warheads to be tested only underground,
was signed. A technological limitation on weapons development
had been agreed to in the sense that,
no one knew how much could be learned from underground
testing, since relatively few underground tests had been
conducted. Such testing was expected to lead to only some
types of nuclear development. Therefore ending all other
forms of nuclear testing was expected to slow the arms
race (Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p. 113)
.
4 . Stockpile Ceilings
The final category of arms control agreements between
the United States and the Soviet Union may be called
"stockpile ceiling agreements," as they attempt to limit the
number and types of weapons and delivery platforms deployed
by each party. The belief is that the fewer the number of
nuclear weapons in the world, the more secure the world will
be. Both the SALT agreements and the recent Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement fall into this category.
The Interim Offensive Forces Agreement was signed in
Moscow on 26 May 1972 and comprised one-half of what are
commonly called the SALT I agreements. 4 One of the main
provisions of this agreement was the prohibition of
4The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is the other
half.
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construction of any new ICBM launchers. Thus, the number of
launchers was fixed at 1,504 for the United States and 1,618
for the Soviet Union. (Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p. 232)
C. US/USSR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL RELATIONSHIP
Actual or potential naval arms controls can similarly be
classified according to the four categories discussed above.
1 . Naval Confidence Building Measures
The best example of a confidence building measure
applied to naval affairs, and designed to reduce the chances
of an accidental superpower confrontation at sea, is the
"Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High
Seas" (Department of State, 1972, pp. 1168-1174) . This pact
prohibits the maneuvering of one's ships and aircraft in a
dangerous or harassing manner while in the vicinity of the
other's ships or aircraft at sea.
The consensus on the operation of the agreement appears
to be that it has succeeded in its purpose. Incidents at
sea have been reduced considerably in numbers, but more
importantly, they have become less sharp and potentially
dangerous (Hill, 1989, p. 59)
.
With the signalling and communication provisions of the
Agreement, it can be seen as a positive step towards reducing
the possibility of conflict between the superpowers' ships at




2. Naval Anti-Proliferation Measures
Anti-proliferation measures have also been proposed
for naval platforms and for various oceanic areas. Nuclear
weapon free zones (NWFZs) at sea are assumed, by their
proponents, to add to international stability in the same
fashion they presumably would on land, namely, the reduction
in the risk of nuclear attack within the zone. (Hill, 1989,
p. 161) Maritime NWFZs have been proposed at various times
and for various regions, including the Mediterranean Sea, the
Indian Ocean, and Nordic waters. Only for the South Pacific
Ocean has a treaty been signed to make the region a NWFZ
.
This treaty, which has been ratified by Australia, New Zealand
and eight other Pacific island nations, prohibits the
manufacture, acquisition, possession, stationing, or testing
of nuclear explosive devices in the region. The zone's
boundaries are, approximately, the Equator, 115 degrees West
longitude (almost to Easter Island) , 60 degrees South latitude
and the western edge of Australia's territorial waters in the
Indian Ocean. ( Survival , 1987, pp. 262-267)
3. Stockpile Ceilings at Sea
The United States and the Soviet Union have also
agreed to ceilings on certain types of "naval" weapons, in
this case "strategic" naval weapons. The limitations in
question are incorporated in the Interim Agreement of the SALT
I Treaty. This treaty limits the total number of "modern"
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and
"modern" submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers
each signatory may deploy: 710 launchers on 44 SSBNs for the
United States and 950 launchers on 62 SSBNs for the Soviets
(Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p. 421) . Although never ratified,
the SALT II Treaty also placed further restrictions on the
number of warheads each SLBM can carry, (Blacker and Duffy,
1984, pp. 446-477) creating another stockpile ceiling for
naval weapons
.
At this point it needs to be noted that these two
treaties, SALT I and SALT II, were the first agreements
between the U.S. and the USSR limiting specific naval weapon
systems. The SSBNs and SLBMs are "unconventional" naval
systems of course. They are weapon systems that are part of
the two nations' "strategic" arsenals, with the capability of
striking the opponent's homeland over intercontinental ranges.
Citing the SLBM agreements as precedents, recent naval arms
control proposals by the Soviet Union have concentrated on
what its spokesmen claim is the next most threatening sea-
based weapon, also capable of striking deep within the Soviet
homeland from a secure launch position, the nuclear armed sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM)
.
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4 . Recent Soviet Naval Arms Control Proposals
The current "Soviet Naval Arms Control Offensive"
(Trost, 1988, p. 421) has tabled a variety of measures in
addition to proposals for limiting systems of strategic range.
In three speeches since July 1986, Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev has aired three broad proposals, each with the
common theme of creating nuclear or military free zones at
sea. These zones have been proposed for the Pacific and
Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean Sea and northern European
waters. (Simpson, 1988, p. 2) The United States has objected,
arguing that any such agreement would restrict the rights of
innocent passage of ships, and would unfairly benefit the
Soviet Union. Russia, U.S. spokesmen have claimed, is a
"continental" power, and could therefore "afford" restrictions
on the movement of military forces at sea. The United States,
by contrast, is a "maritime" nation whose very military and
economic security rests on the unfettered use of the seas.
(Trost, 1988, p. 423)
Of all the naval arms control proposals, the ones
dealing with the SLCM apparently have the highest priority on
the Soviet agenda. In fact, the Soviets have "linked" an
agreement on SLCMs to any successful conclusion of the
20
Strategic Arms Talks (START) negotiation (Hildreth and others,
1988, p. CRS-24)
.
Following the Washington summit in December 1987, the
United States and the Soviet Union pledged in a joint
communique to work to "find a mutually acceptable solution to
the question of limiting the deployment of long-range,
nuclear-armed SLCMs" (New York Times , 12 December 1987, p.
10) . This pledge was followed by a concrete proposal by the
Soviet negotiators at the START talks in February 1988 to
limit the total number of long range (i.e., minimum range of
600 km) SLCMs to 1,000, of which no more than 400 may be
nuclear armed (Gordon, 1988, p. 3) . Although a previous
Soviet proposal attempted to limit SLCMs to certain classes
of ships, this proposal has been withdrawn. The U.S. response
to all SLCM related proposals has been negative, rejecting any
limits on conventional SLCMs, and also rejecting "limitations
on nuclear long range SLCMs as unverifiable" (Leggett and
Lewis, 1988, p. 416)
.
Why have the Soviets been adamant about including
SLCMs in the START agreements? One argument is that since the
Soviets initially insisted that all U.S. cruise missiles with
a range greater than 600 km be counted as individual strategic
21
delivery vehicles, 5 and thus count as part of the START-
proposed 6,000 delivery vehicle limit, their primary concern
over SLCM is its capability to strike deep within the Soviet
homeland (Huisken, 1980, p. 53) . Additionally, the
indistinguishability between the land and ship attack version
of the U.S. SLCM, and between the conventional and nuclear
warhead versions, greatly adds to the Soviet problem of
tracking and identifying these weapons. When the weapon's
"greyness" is combined with the U.S. Navy's proposal to obtain
approximately 4,000 of these missiles, it becomes clear that
Soviet counter-targeting and missile defenses will become very
complicated. (Betts, 1982, p. 7; Johnson, 1982, p. 28)
Finally, there is the argument that "the Soviets are
trying to obtain cheaply, through arms control, military
objectives they cannot afford to attain through force
building." Accordingly, the Soviets recognize the Western
advantages in naval forces, and want to limit these advantages
to the greatest extent possible "while maintaining their own
advantage in ground forces." (Simpson, 1988, p. 5)
Having defined the basic parameters of the current
U.S. - Soviet naval arms control "environment," it is
5The Soviet Union defines long range SLCMs, at least for
arms control purposes, to have a minimum range of 600 km (375
nm)
. See Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p. 452.
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necessary to next provide a more detailed technical discussion




III. SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE BACKGROUND
The modern cruise missile has been defined as "an
unmanned, expendable, armed, aerodynamic, air-breathing,
autonomous vehicle" (Betts, 1981, p. 31). Sea-launched refers
only to the types of platforms on which the missile is
carried; i.e., naval combatants. This weapon traces its
origins to the V-l "flying bomb" of Nazi Germany.
A. AMERICAN SLCM DEVELOPMENT
Even before the end of World War II, American scientists
recovered the remains of V-l missiles from England and began
to develop a similar missile (Werrell, 1985, p. 62).
Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the U.S. Navy also
conducted research on the use of cruise missiles. The Navy's
interest in this weapon was partially a result of its desire
to have a system capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, a
capability not resident in the Navy until the development of
the rocket assisted, carrier launchable P2V bomber in the late
1940s (Werrell, 1985, p. 114). This research resulted in the
Regulus I missile. The Regulus I, first declared operational
in 1955, was 33 feet long and had a range of 600 miles. A
follow-on missile was also developed, named the Regulus II.
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Although a larger, faster and ] onger range missile than its
predecessor, the Regulus II program was stricken in 1958 in
favor of the development of a sea based ballistic missile, the
Polaris. By 1964, even the Regulus I was withdrawn from
active service. 6 (Werrell, 1985, p. 116)
The rapid rise and equally rapid fall of the American
naval cruise missile in the 1950s may be traced to the
continuing competition for systems capable of delivering
nuclear weapons. In the realm of sea based long-range
unmanned weapons, this competition pitted the cruise missile
against the newly conceived submarine launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) . As development of the Polaris SLBM continued,
this weapon appeared to have several advantages over the
cruise missile. These advantages included reliability,
reduced flight times to target and invulnerability to counter
measures. The cruise missile's primary advantage was cost:
it had a lower per unit price than the expensive new-
technology SLBM. (Werrell, 1985, p. 108)
In the early 1970s, however, the concept of a long-range
naval cruise missile was revitalized. The single greatest
6Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, who later as Chief of Naval
Operations helped reintroduce cruise missiles into the Navy's
weapon inventory, called the cancellation of the Regulus
program "the single worst decision about weapons it [the Navy]
made during my years of service." See Zumwalt, 1976, p. 81.
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impetus to this rebirth came from, not the Navy, but the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. In June 1972, Secretary
of Defense Melvin Laird requested $1.3 billion for new
strategic weapons, $20 million of which was earmarked for
research and development into the "submarine-launched cruise
missile" (Betts, 1981, p. 83). Secretary Laird's reasons for
this request remain unclear, but several explanations have
been put forward.
The most often repeated explanation for this impetus is
that Secretary Laird wanted to use SLCM as a "bargaining chip"
in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The SALT
I accords were signed the month prior to the Secretary's
request. At the time "the United States had made an
unsuccessful attempt to bring Soviet naval cruise missiles
into the SALT I negotiations, and Laird felt that SALT II
would produce the same result unless the United States
launched a cruise missile program of its own" (Betts, 1981,
p. 86) .
Additionally, reports Betts, Secretary Laird believed that
U.S. advances in weapons technologies, particularly in anti-
ballistic missile defense, had helped secure Soviet signature
of the SALT I ABM Treaty. A parallel process was hoped for
naval cruise missiles; by developing its own SLCMs, the United
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States would presumably be in a better negotiating position
to limit them. (Betts, 1981, p. 86)
The monies requested by Secretary Laird were intended for
the development of a long-range naval cruise missile. Given
the limited successes of the 1950s with cruise missiles, one
must ask what factors convinced the political leadership that
a relatively small cruise missile, capable of accurately
delivering a warhead to a distant target, had become
technologically feasible. Two technological developments were
of critical importance: small jet engines and improved
guidance systems
.
Guidance technology was an especially crucial factor in
the development of the modern SLCM. Because of the missile's
small size, the warhead, whether conventional or nuclear, also
had to be small. Consequently, in order to destroy a target,
the missile must detonate as close to that target as possible.
The solution to the guidance problem was the use of TERCOM,
an acronym for "terrain contour matching, " in addition to a
less accurate inertial navigation system (INS) . An INS is
used to guide the missile during its flight over water. Once
ashore, TERCOM,
corrects any inertial guidance error by taking periodic
fixes on the terrain features over which the missile is
passing. To do this, the system uses an on-board
computer, in which maps of the relevant terrain are
stored, and a radar altimeter. The computer correlates
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data received from altimeter readings with the altitudes
shown on the maps in its memory. It then calculates the
corrections needed to put the missile back on course and
transmits this information to the missile's autopilot.
(Gottemoeller, 1987, p. 7)
While the accuracy of the current generation of SLCMs has been
a subject of much debate, open source estimates vary from a
low of 250 feet to a high of 400 feet Circular Error Probable
over a range of approximately 1500 miles (Betts, 1981, p. 88;
Gottemoeller, 1987, p. 8) .
The second development greatly facilitating the
development of the modern naval cruise missile was the
improvement made in small, fuel-efficient jet engines. By
the late 1960s, an engine had been developed and successfully
tested which was only 12 inches in diameter and 24 inches long
(Werrell, 1985, p. 141) . This engine was destined to be the
predecessor of the current jet engines in use by U.S. SLCMs,
the Williams International Corporation's 275 kg thrust
turbofan (Blake, 1988, p. 459)
.
These small, fuel-efficient engines met the extended range
requirements of these weapons. The range of the nuclear land
attack Tomahawk, for example, is currently estimated at over
1500 nautical miles. 7
7The name Tomahawk was approved for the SLCM in 1975
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Weapons size was also an important factor in SLCM
development. The original SLCM of Secretary Laird's proposal
was to have been 345 inches long with a 32 inch diameter
(Betts, 1981, p. 85) . Chief of Naval Operations Zumwalt,
however, argued for a missile which would be launchable from
submarine torpedo tubes, ensuring that current submarine
classes would have the same capability as newer boats, and
thereby precluding the need to construct an entirely new class
of submarine. Based on this requirement, the Tomahawk was
limited to no more than 246 inches in length and a 21 inch
diameter, exactly the size of a torpedo tube. (Werrell, 1985,
p. 153)
The missions of the U.S. SLCMs, both nuclear and
conventionally armed, have been the subject of much debate.
"As always, . . . there are questions about the rationale for
the SLCM" (Betts, 1981, p. 99) . This is certainly not the
Navy's perspective. In a recent article, the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations presented
his views on Tomahawk's current role in U.S. strategy. They
are summarized below.
Primarily, Tomahawk is viewed as a "credible and
significant component of nuclear deterrence" (Mustin, 1989,
p. 186) . Since nuclear armed Tomahawks are being deployed
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aboard many ships worldwide, complete Soviet counter target
coverage is believed practically impossible. Thus, nuclear
SLCMs can "threaten targets in the Soviet homeland with a high
degree of assurance" (Mustin, 1989, p. 187) . The result is
an increase in Soviet decision making uncertainty, which is
believed to contribute to deterrence.
Of late, Navy officials have promoted SLCMs as a key
element in the NATO strategy of flexible response and a
possible replacement for the "Euromissiles" that were removed
under the terms of the INF Treaty. Without SLCMs, the
argument goes, only vulnerable dual-capable aircraft remain
to provide the link between battlefield nuclear weapons and
American strategic forces, a situation which risks creating
a "fire-break" in the flexible response strategy. (Mustin,
1989, p. 187)
Tactically, SLCMs are seen to "serve as a powerful
warfighting naval equalizer, should deterrence fail" (Mustin,
1989, p. 188) . "SLCMs . . . distribute naval striking power
across a broad range of ships," whether the targets are afloat
or ashore. By expanding the number of naval strike platforms,
one can assure a synergistic effect between tactical air power
and cruise missiles, an effect which has, in Admiral Mustin'
s
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view, "revolutionized the very nature of naval war." (Mustin,
1989, p. 188/ emphasis in original)
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the Navy's SLCM survived
attempts to restrict or rescind its development and deployment
(Betts, 1981, pp. 89-90) . In 1984 for example, both the
Senate and the House of Representatives voted on amendments
to the 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Bill to
restrict the deployment of Tomahawk "unless the President
certified that the Soviet Union had deployed similar weapons."
Although the House amendment was adopted (Biddle, 20 June
1984, p. A 12), the Senate version was defeated, and nuclear
armed SLCMs were deployed in the last week of June 1984
(Biddle, 28 June 1984, p. A 10)
.
B. SOVIET SLCM DEVELOPMENT
The development of modern U.S. SLCMs only tells one-half
the story. The Soviet history of cruise missile development
began in the immediate post-World War II era. The Soviet
program, like its American counterpart, is heavily indebted
to exploitation of captured German wartime technology
(Breemer, 1985, p. 174)
.
The Soviet Navy has progressed through several
evolutionary stages in its development of SLCMs. The first
medium range (150 - 600 km) Soviet SLCM was the SS-N-3
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Shaddock. 8 A contemporary of the U.S. Regulus missile, the
SS-N-3 went into service in 1960. Armed with both nuclear
and conventional warheads, the land attack version of this
missile had an estimated range (to fuel exhaustion) of over
400 nm (740 km) (Polmar, 1986, p. 428; Couhat and Prezelin,
1988, p. 563)
.
A successor to the SS-N-3, the SS-N-12 Sandbox, became
operational in 1973. Although similar in size and armament
to the SS-N-3, but not commonly credited with a land-attack
role, the SS-N-12 achieves supersonic speeds at the expense
of range, being limited to approximately 300 nm (555 km)
(Polmar, 1986, p. 429; Couhat and Prezelin, 1988, p. 564)
.
The SS-N-19 Shipwreck SLCM is the third evolutionary stage
of Soviet medium range cruise missiles. First estimated to
be operational in 1981, the SS-N-19 combines the best
characteristics of its predecessors with the ability to be
launched from either submerged submarines or from surface
ships. (Polmar, 1986, p. 431; Couhat and Prezelin, 1988, p.
563)
The Soviet Union's most modern SLCMs are the SS-N-21 and
the SS-NX-24, both of which are departures from the previous
8This author will use NATO names and designations for
Soviet missiles.
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evolutionary SLCM development. The SS-N-21 is similar in size
and appearance to Tomahawk, while the not yet operational SS-
NX-24 is estimated to be much larger than the SS-N-21. Both
of these SLCMs are estimated to be only nuclear capable
(Department of Defense, 1988, p. 53)
.
The SS-N-21 and SS-NX-24 are departures from previous
Soviet naval cruise missiles in two respects. First, these
missiles have a much longer range than the SS-N-3 and its
derivatives. In fact, their ranges approach that of the old
SS-N-6 SLBM. Secondly, instead of employing an inertial
guidance system solely, or an INS with mid-course guidance,
the SS-N-21, and possibly the SS-NX-24 as well, are estimated
to employ a TERCOM guidance system similar to the Tomahawk's.
(Blake, 1988, p. 16)
These two factors of long range and accurate guidance
support the American estimate that Soviet SLCMs will be used
primarily in a theater, land attack role (Department of
Defense, 1988, p. 53) . The possibility of the Soviets
targeting the U.S. mainland cannot be discounted, particularly
the threat these missiles may pose against "soft" targets,
such as Strategic Air Command bomber bases. The geographical
launch envelopes to which Soviet submarines must transit to
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target the U.S. mainland, however, puts these submarines at
risk from U.S. naval anti-submarine warfare.
This chapter has shown how the American long range SLCM,
initially developed to serve as an arms control bargaining
chip, has been given a variety of missions, from a
"significant component of nuclear deterrence" to tactical
anti-ship firepower, with either a nuclear or conventional
warhead. Although Soviet missiles, assessed to be only
nuclear capable, cannot yet demonstrate this wide range of
missions, such a development cannot be discounted. To some,
this multiplication of missions, while keeping the airframes
indistinguishable, has resulted in an "unstable" weapons
system whose numbers, characteristics, and deployment and
employment patterns need to be constrained through agreed arms




IV. SLCMS AND ARMS CONTROL
The very characteristics discussed above make SLCMs an
"arms control problem:" they are nuclear armed, highly
accurate, physically small and capable of flying great
distances to their targets. It is widely held that these
characteristics make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to create a verifiable limit on the overall number
of SLCMs, especially on the nuclear armed version. But
verification concerns are only part of the "problem" between
SLCMs and the arms control world. Because of their "greyness"
(being neither completely strategic nor exclusively tactical),
SLCMs pose important issues for American national security and
military strategy.
A. NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
The controversy that surrounds SLCM concerns the view that
the weapon is inherently destabalizing to the Soviet-American
strategic balance. This view stems from the fear by some that
the Soviets could use their SLCMs in a "leading eda<=>" attack
against the command, control and communication nodes of the
United States, as well as the national leadership, possibly
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as the first wave of a larger nuclear strike. By deploying
both conventional and nuclear SLCM variants, the Soviets,
would present the United States with an ambiguous attack
threat. If the missiles were detected in flight, the
possibility that they constituted a conventional attack
would tend to suppress a U.S. urge to launch a nuclear
response on tactical warning. (Gottemoeller, 1989, p. 177)
Additionally, it is said that the limited capabilities of the
existing North American air defense system could not ensure
detection of the incoming cruise missiles, thereby threatening
a surprise decapitating attack against the U.S. National
Command Authority (NCA) . In this scenario, SLCMs could
revitalize the role once played by YANKEE SSBNs deployed to
the East and West coasts of the United States: a force
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead against "soft" targets
with little or no warning. Without advance warning of an
impending nuclear attack, the U.S. ability to retaliate would
be jeopardized, thereby creating an "unstable" situation that
might provide the incentive for a Soviet first strike. Since
an attack of this nature could be executed with just "tens of
missiles," proponents of this view have recommended banning
all nuclear armed SLCMs. (Postol, 1989, pp. 193-198, 201-202;
emphasis in original)
The counter argument to this view argues that SLCMs add
to, not detract from, stable deterrence by providing the
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United States with a "flexible, mobile system, dispersed
throughout the world's oceans" which "defeat Soviet targeting
in advance" (Mustin, 1989, p. 186) :
Naval forces in general, and SLCMs in particular, offer
options for extending a war, either geographically or
temporally, thus denying Soviet victory even if they
should achieve some initial success on the Central Front.
This capability to offset Warsaw Pact superiority on the
European continent is the most important reason for
rejecting limitations on these [nuclear] systems (Mustin,
1989, p. 187) .
Another controversy concerns the 50 percent reduction in
strategic forces in the wake of a START treaty. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed in
principle to a strategic force ceiling of 6,000 warheads on
1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (Hildreth and
others, 1988, p. CRS-2), a position reiterated at the
Washington summit in December 1987 (New York Times , 12
December 1987, p. 10) . If deployment of nuclear armed SLCMs
remains unregulated , there is concern that a significant
circumvention of these limits could result (Harvey and Ride,
1988, p. 1). For example, the U.S. Navy has requested to
procure 758 nuclear armed SLCMs (Gordon, 1988, p. 3) which,
if fully deployed, would result in a 47.4 percent increase
over the START limit on delivery vehicles, and a 12.6 percent
increase in the number of warheads. Critics maintain that if
the development and deployment of naval cruise missiles
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continues unchecked, including the eventual deployment of
longer range missiles with supersonic speed, the START
"limits" will lose more and more of their significance as a
deep cut in the strategic inventories of the superpowers.
Conversely, Admiral Mustin is one of those who have argued
that the numerical limitations of a START treaty could not be
applied to SLCMs because "there is no practical means of
differentiating between nuclear and conventional" variants
(Mustin, 1989, p. 189) . Since one cannot distinguish the
nuclear and conventional variants, one cannot count the number
of nuclear missiles available. Consequently, Admiral Mustin
has argued that there should be nothing more than declaratory
limits on nuclear SLCMs (Mustin, 1989, pp. 189-190)
.
The possible imposition of numerical limits on SLCM types
and quantities has also raised several national security
issues. The first concerns the possibly adverse impact of a
limited SLCM inventory on the Navy's ability to execute its
missions in the world external to Europe. A 600
(conventional) weapon ceiling (as has been proposed by the
Soviet Union) , of which only a fraction would be at sea at any
one time, would severely limit the possible number of
conventional SLCMs in a given area at a given time, thus
reducing their potential impact on a regional conflict.
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Alternatively, the Soviet-proposed floor of 600 km on the
range of "long range" SLCMs has been called "artificial"
(Yost, 1988, p. 5) and probably prejudicial to U.S. interests.
The Soviets have at least three SLCMs
with ranges far greater than the Harpoon (the SS-N-3, the
SS-N-12, and SS-N-19), but have evidently not confirmed
that any of them have ranges exceeding 600 km. The
majority of current Soviet SLCMs (over 2,700 weapons)
would therefore not be affected by the Soviet proposed
treaty regime (Yost, 1988, p. 5)
.
Thus, a limiting agreement on SLCMs with greater than 600 km
range would have no impact at all on the Soviet Navy's
existing inventory of short- and medium-range SLCMs; it would
only limit the new SS-N-21 and SS-NX-24
.
The final national security consideration on a numerically
limited SLCM inventory concerns the U.S. Navy's policy of
neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence (or
absence) of nuclear weapons aboard its ships, submarines or
aircraft. The on-site inspection of U.S. ships or submarines
as part of a SLCM verification regime would, of necessity,
involve the confirmation by Soviet inspectors of the presence
or absence of nuclear armed SLCMs, thus compromising the NCND
policy. Althouah it has been suaaested that the United States
could trust the Soviet Union to uphold the NCND policy by the
inclusion of a confidentiality provision in the treaty (Harvey
and Ride, 1988, p. 7), this author believes that this is a
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dubious proposition. The NCND policy is applicable to more
situations than U.S. - Soviet relations. Three areas of
concern which immediately come to mind are terrorist threats
to Navy ships, restriction of port calls abroad, and the
freedom to navigate in waters which have been declared nuclear
weapon free zones. The NCND policy preserves naval
flexibility, minimizes placing friendly governments in
embarrassing situations, and lessens the threat to U.S. naval




The first verification issue concerns the establishment
of agreed data bases . If an agreement is signed limiting
SLCMs, it will be necessary for both sides to determine how
many missile airframes the other has manufactured. It is to
be hoped that adequate procedures for this determination would
be included in the agreement. Regardless, an inventory count
would have to be obtained, since from this baseline current
SLCM inventories will change to approach the agreed limits.
Because of its importance to a] 1 subsequent verification, this
accounting must be as accurate as possible.
Next, there is the problem of covert production and
storage. In any inventory, the number of items is constantly
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diminished due to a variety of causes. In a SLCM inventory,
these causes may include use of a missile for an exercise,
operational life expectancy, or accidental damage to an
airframe. To maintain the stockpile at its limit, missile
production facilities must be maintained and new airframes
constructed. The verification problem is to ensure that no
excess missiles are produced and then covertly stored, so that
neither side can accumulate, first a "creep-out," and next a
"break-out" SLCM capability. The missiles' small size and the
relative ease of manufacture of components greatly complicates
the confident verification of a numerical limit on SLCMs
.
The next verification issue has been touched on above:
the indistinguishability between nuclear and conventional SLCM
variants. It is widely thought impossible to identify,
without access to the missile, its warhead package. Some
verification techniques have been proposed to solve this
problem, and will be discussed below (i.e., nuclear detection
methods) . They may provide an increased degree of confidence
in identifying the missiles' warhead; without a highly
intrusive inspection regime, however, it is impossible to
confidently verify the number and type of SLCM available to
the other party.
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Another verification concern associated with the missiles
indistinguishability is the possibility that a conventionally
armed missile might surreptitiously be converted to a nuclear
armed one. It has been reported that laboratory studies as
early as 1972 proved the feasibility of matching the U.S.
Navy's Mk-48 torpedo with a dual use, convertible conventional
and nuclear warhead (Polmar and Kerr, 1986, p. 67) . As a SLCM
is the same size as a Mk-48 torpedo, it is reasonable that
there are no technological barriers to the development of a
convertible SLCM.
It can be seen that the arms control impact of SLCM is a
complicated one. The impact of nuclear armed SLCMs on
strategic stability and on START-agreed limitations is still
being hotly debated. If a SLCM agreement is reached, there
are concerns about the probable impact on the Navy's ability
to execute its missions vis a vis not only the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact, but in a "violent world" elsewhere as
well. The impact of such an agreement on the Navy's NCND
policy can also be grave. The verifiability of an agreement
limiting both conventional and nuclear armed SLCMs is a major
concern: can agreed data bases be established? Can covert
production and storage of SLCMs be prevented? Can one
adequately verify a sub-ceiling on nuclear armed SLCMs given
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their external similarity to their conventionally arms
cousins? It is these questions towards which this paper now
turns. But, before discussing possible methods of
verification, it is important to first understand the
different Soviet and American perspectives on the concept and
its practice.
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V. CONCEPTS OF VERIFICATION
Why do nations need to verify arms control agreements?
Why is verification such an important issue? These questions
are at the core of the arguments surrounding verification.
In the United States, there are at least three "schools of
thought" on verification: substantive , legalistic , and
metaphysical (Buchan, 1983, p. 16). This variety of opinion
may also exist within the Soviet Union, however, there is only
one official Soviet view on verification. This chapter will
discuss not only the Soviet and American concepts of
verification, but also why verification is so important and
what its limitations are.
A. IMPORTANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF VERIFICATION
Verification of arms control agreements is important to
governments for one overriding reason: these agreements limit
what most nations believe to be their ultimate guarantor of
security, i.e., their armed forces. Naturally, governments
are loathe to reduce their military capabilities with respect
to a potential adversary, but most are willing to negotiate
away certain specific hardware items (and thus their
capabilities) in return for increased security. This enhanced
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security is the greatest expected benefit of arms control
agreements, but it is critically dependent on mutual
confidence that the other side abides by the agreement in
fact
.
Unfortunately, there are no guarantees of the honesty of
another government. A country must ensure that its national
security is not threatened by violations of arms control
treaties. If a violation is detected, one's confidence in the
other's compliance is reduced and national security may be
endangered. This concept is echoed by the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency which argues "verification of arms
limitation agreements is necessary because the information
required to ascertain compliance will probably not normally
be available - and because a nation cannot afford to rely for
its own security on trust alone" (Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1976, p. 3)
.
Verification, however, is not a "cure-all." It cannot do
everything. Treaty compliance is a sovereign act of nations;
it cannot be forced upon a nation despite the strictest
possible verification regime; at best, the verification
process can hope to detect and evaluate the magnitude of
violations. Additionally, verification is partially a
reactive activity; it can only respond to the activities of
45
another party. As such, the verification process is always
one step behind, continually following the actions of the
perpetrator.
B. AMERICAN VIEWS OF VERIFICATION
The official U.S. position on the purposes of verification
is given above, essentially, "... to ascertain compliance"
with an arms control treaty. This statement allows for both
broad and narrow interpretations of the requirements of
verification, which chiefly depend, in turn, on the definition
of compliance. As mentioned above, three schools of thought
are prevalent in the United States.
The "substantive" school's greatest concern is not with
the arms control agreement or with verification per se , but
with the overall strategic balance . This school believes that
"an arms control treaty can be adequately verified if neither
side could alter the strategic balance by undetected cheating"
(Buchan, 1983, p. 16) . Proponents of this belief grant that
small violations of a treaty are virtually inevitable. But,
they insist, such violations are unimportant, that because of
their "minuteness," they cannot by themselves be strategically
significant. One prominent scientist and commentator on
verification issues summed up this view as follows:
Past experience with arms control agreements has taught
us that it is not necessary to see everything, that
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"adequate verification" requires only that we be able to
dptect in a timely fashion any violation that could
threaten the national security of either country (Tsipis,
April 1988, p. 15)
.
The practical consequence of this view is that treaty
verification regimes need not be very detailed or intrusive.
Since only the violations by the enemy which affect the
strategic balance are important, one need not be concerned
whether weapons inventories precisely match the agreed limits.
The key assumption of this school of thought is that
strategically significant violations can be detected remotely,
and that large violations that "matter" will be detectable by
the verification method agreed to in the treaty.
The "legalistic" school is less willing to accept arms
control treaty violations than are their substantive
counterparts. Proponents insist that arms control treaties
are just that: treaties made under the provisions of
international law which bind the signatories to certain
allowed and prohibited acts. This school regards a treaty
"... as a legal contract and consider[s] violations to be
serious issues per se regardless of their relative strategic
significance" (Buchan, 1983, p. 16). Any violation is
important not for its immediate military consequences, but for
the conduct and expectations that it will set for future
agreements (Krass, 1985, p. 143) . A related consideration is
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that a small violation by the Soviet Union may be a test of
the overall U.S. resolve regarding arms control treaties. It
has been argued that "we should not tolerate non-adherence in
small things lest we lose our credibility in insisting on
adherence in large" (Slocombe, 1983, p. 81, cited by Krass,
1985, p. 143). Consequently, this school sees verification
as a very important issue on its own merits, and insists on
a very strict verification regime. Verification, proponents
maintain, must be able to account for all the limited weapons
at all times as this is the only way to ensure the fulfillment
of the legal contract. As a corollary, this school inveighs
against any verification regime which does not meet its strict
requirements, calling them simply "confidence building
measures," rather than verification measures.
The third school of thought in the American verification
spectrum has been called the "metaphysical" school, which
is the most difficult of all [the schools] to satisfy in
terms of verification. Its concerns go well beyond the
letter of any strategic arms agreement, insisting in
effect that the Soviets conform to some unspoken behavior
code and interpreting Soviet actions as measures of intent
and character (Buchan, 1983, p. 16)
.
The strict verification regime of the legalistic school is
not enough. Not only must the treaty be adhered to precisely
and in toto , but also the Soviets must live up to the "spirit"
of the agreement, particularly the American interpretation of
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that spirit. "The essential demand of the metaphysical school
is not that the Soviet Union demonstrate compliance with arms
control treaties, but that it prove the absence of non-
compliance " (Krass, 1985, p. 144; emphasis in original) .
Thus, to the metaphysical school, the Soviet Union is presumed
guilty of treaty violations until it proves itself innocent.
C. SOVIET VIEWS OF VERIFICATION
It is important first of all to understand Soviet
definitions of terms such as "verification" and "monitoring."
Unfortunately, precise and concise Soviet definitions of these
two terms are not readily available. Generally, however, "in
Soviet literature, the word kontrol ' is used most often in
discussing the verification process, especially to describe
the overall process" (Spurlock, 1985, pp. 2.2 - 2.3). The
kontrol ' process is believed to have four distinct components;
namely, (1) collection of data, (2) processing of information,
(3) judging conformity to agreements, and (4) proposals of
measures, if necessary, to change the situation. This process
is akin to the United States' official definition of
verification which states, in part, that "... in the
vocabulary of arms control, verification refers to the process
of assessing compliance with the provisions contained in arms
control treaties and agreements" (Arms Control and Disarmament
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Agency, 1976, p. 2) . While both the Soviet kontrol ' process
and the American verification process involve making judgments
regarding a signatory's compliance with an agreement, the
Soviet variant also provides for procedures by which
appropriate responses to perceived violations can be
generated.
Another word of importance in the Soviet arms control
vocabulary is proverka . Proverka is believed to be a
component of the kontrol ' process, and can best be described
as an " act of monitoring , " or specific method of data
collection designed "to augment the process of monitoring."
One example of proverka would be an on-site inspection.
(Spurlock, 1985, pp. 2.5 - 2.6; emphasis in original) Thus,
proverka corresponds closely to the American concept of
monitoring, a concept which covers all methods of data
collection
.
Unlike the actual definitions, the purpose of the Soviet
verification process is clearly stated in, for example,
Verification of Arms Limitation and Disarmament by Roland
Timerbayev. Timerbayev, who has been the Soviet deputy
ambassador to the United Nations and deputy director of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry's Department of International
Organizations, is a recognized Soviet expert on disarmament
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and foreign policy (Timerbayev, 1987, p. 8 fn) . The "only
purpose of verification, " Timerbayev states, "is to promote
the fulfillment of disarmament agreements" (Timerbayev, 1984,
p. 16) . While this bald statement may be the only Soviet
purpose of verification, Timerbayev nevertheless makes clear
several additional points associated with the verification
process. First, any verification provision must be linked
"extremely closely to the process of limiting and eliminating
weapons" as a "means of furthering the implementation of
measures to restrain the arms race and achieve disarmament."
Any other purpose of verification provisions, such as
intelligence collection, is accordingly an improper use of
that provision. (Timerbayev, 1984, pp. 12-17)
To ensure that the verification process does not go
"beyond its purpose of contributing to the fulfillment of
disarmament agreements," and become a form of sanctioned
intelligence, the Soviets hold to the principle of
proportionality between the "means, forms and methods" of
verification on the one hand, and the scope of the disarmament
measures on the other. "The United States and its allies,"
Timerbayev argues, "ordinarily advance verification proposals
which deliberately go beyond that which is actually required
for assuring the fulfillment of this or that specific
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disarmament measure." Instead, he urges, there must be a
strict correlation between each step towards disarmament and
the methods used to verify that step. (Timerbayev, 1984, pp.
17 - 19)
These two concepts, i.e., linking verification with
disarmament generally, and linking specific verification
procedures with the specifics of the agreed arms control
regime, are graphically demonstrated by the verification
arrangements allowed under the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty. Not only are "intrusive" on-site
inspections permitted as the banned missiles are removed from
their operational bases and destroyed, but also the Soviets
are allowing the United States to peripherally monitor an
active Soviet missile production facility. By doing so, the
Soviet Union is helping the United States to verify that this
facility, which previously produced the banned SS-20s, is not
covertly producing new SS-20s (Leggett and Lewis, 1988, p.
412) .
Another Soviet verification concept is, according to
Timerbayev, the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of states. "Verification should be carried out in
such a manner that its functioning is not directed toward
interference in the internal affairs of states." Although
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this statement may be broadly or narrowly interpreted, it is
toward the area of compliance enforcement that it is directed:
any unilateral action by the verifying state to enforce
sanctions arising from perceived non-compliance is deemed to
fall within the realm of this non-interference statement.
Preferable from the Soviet point of view is the formation of
an international agency under the United Nations Charter with
the authority to apply sanctions, but requiring unanimous
approval before committing to action. (Timerbayev, 1984, pp.
19 - 22)
Significantly, no arms limitation agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union discusses procedures should
one side detect the other in violation of the agreement. Even
the Standing Consultative Commission, set up as a result of
the SALT I accords, cannot take action on a perceived
violation; it serves only as a forum for each side to air its
grievances. Any agreement on SLCMs will most likely follow
the historical pattern with no compliance enforcement measures
being incorporated into the agreement.
Another verification concern of importance to Timerbayev
is the use of verification issues for "improper political
purposes -- to avoid disarmament or delay the achievement of
agreement on specific, urgent arms limitation questions."
53
Timerbayev' s argument is that disarmament and the consequent
increase in world security should not be held hostage to the
concerns of one nation's political faction's argument whether
an agreement is verifiable or not. (Timerbayev, 1984, pp. 28 -
29)
Timerbayev' s frustration with the perceived politicization
of the verification issue in the American arena can be seen
in the following statement:
The understanding [has] emerged that the objective of
verification is to serve as a means of assuring the
fulfillment of disarmament agreements. The unquestionable
importance of verification of the observance of agreements
[has been] broadly recognized. At the same time, it [has
become] apparent that verification is only one of the
factors affecting the viability and stability of
agreements, along with political, military, technical, and
other factors (Timerbayev, 1984, p. 30) .
Thus, to the Soviets, verification is only one of several
means to ensure fulfillment of an agreement. In the United
States, verification is viewed as the overwhelmingly important
method of ensuring compliance of an arms limitation or
disarmament agreement. Consequently, verification becomes a
highly charged political issue. The Soviet observer and
compliance analyst is less reliant upon verification
methodologies than his Western counterpart and consequently,




VI. METHODS OF VERIFICATION
This chapter discusses the various methods that have been
proposed for verifying a SLCM agreement, if consummated. As
discussed in Chapter IV, the three verification issues
regarding SLCMs are: (1) establishment of agreed SLCM
inventory data bases, (2) the indistinguishability between
nuclear and conventional SLCM variants, and (3) the
possibility that a conventionally armed SLCM may be converted
to a nuclear armed one. These issues are potentially
susceptible of solution by seven different verification
methods. The first four are concerned with verifying the
total number of SLCMs in a nation's inventory; the next two
attempt to resolve the concern over the indistinguishability
between conventional and nuclear SLCMs, and the final method
is aimed at preventing the conversion of conventionally armed
SLCMs to nuclear armed, or vice versa .
Each of these methods of verification has been discussed
in the arms control literature, but generally as a component
of a specific verification regime. The goal in this chapter
is to discuss each method individually. Although it is
realized that any agreed verification regime will include
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some, if not all, of these methods, it is hoped that by
discussing them individually both the merits and demerits of
each may be exposed.
Each method of verification under consideration is
examined from three different perspectives: first is a
description of the method and how it works; next, the
discussion looks at the advantages and disadvantages of each
in the verification of a SLCM agreement and finally, the
discussion concentrates on what the method may indicate about
Soviet compliance with the SLCM agreement
.
A. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
"National technical means (NTM) of verification" have come
to be associated primarily with satellite reconnaissance
capabilities. The term, however, is much broader than that;
NTM include collection capabilities on the oceans, ashore, and
in the air, as well as in space. Two categories of NTM which
may have the greatest impact on a SLCM verification regime are
photo-reconnaissance and electronic intelligence intercept
satellites. Only these two categories of NTM are discussed
below.
It is recognized that most information on national
satellite reconnaissance programs, whether U.S. or Soviet, is
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highly classified. All information on the systems cited in
this discussion is drawn from unclassified sources.
1
. Photo-reconnaissance Satellites
Photo-reconnaissance satellites have been used by the
United States for intelligence gathering and target mapping
purposes since the early 1960s. Use of these assets for arms
control verification purposes was first "institutionalized"
in the SALT I Interim Agreement. Article V states:
1 . For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance
with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party
shall use national technical means of verification at its
disposal
. . . (Blacker and Duffy, 1984, p. 419) .
While early photo-reconnaissance satellites relied
upon a camera and film return system, the current generation
of satellites make use of an imaging system in which no film
is actually carried aboard the spacecraft (Burroughs, 1986,
pp. 226-227) . The key component of this system is the charge-
coupled device, or CCD, which has been described as
a high density information storage device with a capacity
of about 10 5 bits per cm 3 . The information, in the form
of an image of the scene being observed, is stored as
electrical charges under a linear or two dimensional array
of closely spaced electrodes (Jasani, 1987, p. 17).
The varying light levels of the scene determine how much
charge is deposited upon each electrode, thus creating
variations in brightness and darkness in the final image. The
system's ability to distinguish between objects, i.e.,
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resolution, is determined by the number of electrodes which
are known as picture elements or pixels in the CCD array. A
commercial CCD image sensor has been constructed with a 2,048
x 2,048 pixel format (Jasani, 1987, p. 17).
To get the electrical charges of each pixel from the
satellite to the ground, imaging satellites must transmit
their data streams first to a communications relay satellite
which then retransmits the data to a ground site. The relay
satellite is required because of the orbital geometry of the
imaging satellite; if it is over the Soviet Union, it cannot
be in communications "line of sight" with a ground station in
the United States. (Burroughs, 1986, p. 227)
What is the resolution of current national level
imaging reconnaissance satellites? Burroughs, who arrived at
his answer to the question by a combination of "optical
science" and "political science," believes the best resolution
capability to be in the vicinity of two to four inches
(Burroughs, 1986, p. 248) . This means objects which are
separated by more than four inches are detectable as
individual objects.
The greatest advantage of a space based reconnaissance
system with regard to verification of arms control agreements
is that it is non-intrusive. Although the inspected party may
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be aware when he is vulnerable to satellite imaging, and
although imaging satellites cannot see as many detail features
as human inspectors on the surface of the earth, orbital
imaging systems have allowed nations to routinely observe and
inspect other nations' military facilities, whether for arms
control or intelligence purposes, without requiring intrusive,
on-site, human observation.
A second advantage of photo-reconnaissance satellites
is their ability to cover vast amounts of territory more
quickly than ground based inspection teams. One of the
gravest concerns in the verification of numerical limits on
SLCMs is the possibility of a nation covertly producing
unauthorized SLCMs. Imaging satellite reconnaissance systems
can greatly ease this concern by being able to search for and
locate other sites which may be covertly producing missiles.
Arguably, this detection task may be somewhat eased by virtue
of the highly structured and centralized characteristics of
the Soviet military organization:
All command organizations, foremost among them the
military, follow sets of narrowly defined, carefully
established procedures without appreciable variation.
That is to say, all military organizations follow rigid
patterns in the type and numbers of equipment used,
training, support, and operational practices. (Burroughs,
1986, p. 113)
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The same may also be said for military hardware construction
facilities. Accordingly, since the size, shape and
operational patterns for the construction of Soviet SLCMs is
probably already known, the detection of another similar, but
unauthorized facility, while difficult, is not impossible.
If such a facility were detected, and suspicions raised as to
its products, challenge, on-site inspections could be used to
confirm or rebuke the suspicions.
The drawback to this verification argument is that,
while in production, SLCMs are not a resource-intensive
system. SLCM production facilities are probably little
different from thousands of other light industrial facilities
in the USSR. To identify one with enough confidence to
recommend a challenge inspection may be analogous to having
found the proverbial "needle in a haystack." This is
especially important if the number of challenge inspections
is limited by the treaty.
A second possible use for imaging reconnaissance
satellites is as a tool for counting total SLCM inventories.
To fulfill this role, the treaty would have to establish
special verification procedures, such as moving SLCMs out of
storage facilities periodically, and have them arranged so
that the missiles can be individually counted. Although the
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missiles are small, given the estimated resolution capability
of modern satellites, they could be discretely identified.
Unfortunately, use of an imaging system alone to
verify SLCM inventory totals may not be sufficient for an
accurate and high confidence estimate. First, one could not
be sure that all SLCMs in storage were removed and exposed.
The missile is small and may be easily concealable from
satellite-based sensors. Additionally, there is the problem
of missiles deployed aboard operational fleet units. They too
cannot be counted by an imaging system alone. Another concern
is the possibility of Soviet use of maskirovka techniques to
deny information to or to deceive American verification
analysts
.
Photo-reconnaissance satellites alone can provide
little information for the determination of compliance to a
SLCM agreement. While limited in the ability to count and
identify individual SLCMs in the attempt to obtain an
inventory count, the imaging system is valuable for the
purpose of broad area searches; detection of suspicious
activity and/or signs of maskirovka could then cue the
application of other "higher-resolution" verification methods.
This broad area search capability may be the most useful




2 . Electronic Intelligence Satellites
Electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites are the
second category of satellite-based national technical means
of verification that may be useful in ensuring SLCM treaty
compliance. Actually, ELINT satellites comprise only one-half
of the broad category of signals intelligence (SIGINT)
satellites. Communications intelligence (COMINT) satellites,
whose primary mission is to collect and relay communications-
related signals for later analysis, comprise the other half.
COMINT satellites are excluded from this discussion as SLCMs
do not "communicate" in the traditional sense of sending data
from one location to a receiver at another location.
ELINT satellites may be used in a SLCM verification
regime to assist the photo-reconnaissance satellites in the
detection and inventory-accounting of long range SLCMs. These
satellites are designed to detect a wide range of electronic
emissions, and are particularly targeted against radar
signals. Verification assistance may be obtained through the
intercept of the emissions from a missile radar altimeter
during an operational test. By detecting a radar altimeter
emission from an in-flight missile test, one can be sure that
one airframe has been removed from the inventory. Even if the
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test missile were not armed, the airframe would probably be
destroyed upon impacting the target.
The drawbacks to this method of inventory-accounting
are manifold. The primary one is that this method relies upon
the interception of a signal which may be too weak to detect.
SLCMs fly very close to the surface of the earth, which means
that the power requirement for a radar altimeter need not be
very great and the resultant emissions quite weak. Also, one
cannot assume a perfect reflection of the radar signal off the
surface; a mixture of scattering and absorption of the
incident energy is unavoidable. Finally, the orbital
mechanics of the satellites may make the collection of such
a weak signal impossible. ELINT satellites at geosynchronous
orbit may be too distant to detect the reflected energy, while
those in low-earth orbit may not have the dwell time or
orientation to intercept the radar altimeter's reflection.
Operational or test firings of SLCMs provide
compliance evaluators with a unique challenge if the treaty
sets a maximum limit on a SLCM inventory. Presumably each
missile fired, for whatever purpose, is replaceable by new
production so as to keep the allotted inventory at full
strength. Compliance evaluators must be able to correlate the
number of SLCMs produced with the number of missiles fired in
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addition to those which have reached the end of their service
lives, or are accidentally damaged. In order to keep an
accurate "balance sheet," SLCM firings must be detectable; if
not, one cannot be sure whether SLCM production has not
generated an "excess" of weapons. Although this possibility
has not attracted the attention of other authors, detection
of fired missiles by satellite based electronic intercept
offers one potential solution to this verification concern.
B. DATA EXCHANGES
The second broad verification method discussed in regard
to SLCMs is the exchange of data among the signatories; its
purpose is to establish current SLCM inventory "baselines."
The procedures for these, and subsequent, exchanges should be
a component part of a treaty. Baseline inventory data bases
are a "must" for any treaty limiting the total number of SLCMs
since it is from these baselines that current SLCM inventories
will change to approach their agreed maximums. Specifically,
there are four data items that must be exchanged for
verification or compliance assessment. The first one is a
tally of the number of missile airframes available to a
nation, including not only those in an operational status, but
also those in test and evaluation, research, or storage. The
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goal is a count of all airframes that could, if necessary, be
converted into an operational missile.
After the current inventory baselines are established and
agreed upon, it is necessary to know how that inventory
changes, whether through addition (i.e., new production) or
subtraction (i.e., operational tests). The second required
data set, the number of missiles being produced for either
repair or replacement, solves one-half of this problem. The
problem of inventory reduction has been discussed above. The
final two required data sets relate to verification of
submitted inventory information, namely the location of (1)
SLCM production and repair facilities, and (2) location of
SLCM storage facilities.
The primary advantage derived from these data exchanges
is that each signatory has in its possession a working data
base of the other's total SLCM inventory. As this inventory
changes due to additions or deletions, subsequent data
exchanges are used to periodically "balance-the-books .
"
Unfortunately however, this verification method cannot
ensure against outright lying and falsification of data base
information. It is for this reason that one must have the
ability to verify that the data received are indeed correct
to begin with. Furthermore, this method does not address the
65
problem of covert production or storage of SLCMs since, after
all, such information would not be a part of the exchanged
data. If judged to be accurate, however, exchanged data bases
can be a powerful tool in the evaluation of treaty compliance,
at least for the total number of missiles in the inventory.
Although one must continue to be on guard against covert
production, accurate data exchanges can help reduce the
suspicion of covert production and storage.
C. ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
The next verification method, on-site inspections (OSI),
has received a great deal of attention during the past 18
months. This attention is largely attributable to the
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed in
December 1987. This was the first arms control treaty that
permitted the use of on-site inspection (OSI) procedures in
the signatories' nations. (Leggett and Lewis, 1988, p. 410)
In a SLCM agreement, OSI may fulfill three requirements
for effective verification of SLCM inventories. The first is
for the periodic inspection of SLCM production, storage,
repair and deployment facilities. Such inspections are
intended to give the inspecting team knowledge of the
available SLCM storage capacity and the rate at which new
SLCMs could be produced. A second requirement would be
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knowledge of the destruction of no-longer operational
missiles. The problem of depletion of SLCM inventory by
flight testing has been discussed above. It may be necessary
to allow inspectors to be present at flight tests to observe
this form of inventory reduction. Production and destruction
monitoring as described above would be necessary to maintain
strict SLCM inventory accounting.
Finally, an OSI verification regime must have the
capability to initiate challenge on-site inspections. Without
such inspections, the covert production and storage problem
remains. Satellite reconnaissance systems may be able to
identify sites suspected of covertly producing SLCMs, but
without challenge OSI one can neither confirm nor disprove the
suspicions
.
How would such a verification regime work? If one assumes
only on-site inspections, including challenge inspections,
were agreed to as the verification method, designated
inspectors would travel to the agreed facilities for activity
monitoring. Unfortunately however, only a limited number of
individuals would presumably be allowed to inspect these
facilities. One study estimated that a typical on-site
inspection team, designed to verify a comprehensive test ban
treaty, would require a minimum of nine inspectors and eleven
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support personnel at each facility (Krass, 1985, p. 220) . In
another example, the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency has
approximately 200 individuals assigned to the Soviet Union for
the verification of the INF Treaty, exclusive of those
assigned to perimeter portal monitoring duties (Leggett and
Lewis, 1988, p. 410) . Although a SLCM inspection team
probably may not be as large as one monitoring a comprehensive
test ban treaty, fewer inspectors per site will face a greater
reliance upon the host country for assistance and support in
completing the monitoring process.
One concern in the operational use of OSI is the degree
of latitude inspectors will be given to "roam" about a
facility during an inspection. Essentially, this is a
question of what can be considered within the purview of the
inspectors. Naturally, the inspection team would like to have
complete freedom to move about a facility to observe its
operations. Conversely, the host country is sure to want to
restrict movements in order to limit the amount of collateral
intelligence the inspection team might gather. Additionally,
many, if not most, defense industry production and storage
facilities are multi-purpose, so that systems not covered
under the treaty are liable to be present, yet to which the
inspectors have no need for access. This is a concern for
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resolution at the negotiating table, although solutions
reached on paper cannot ensure compliance with those words in
actuality
.
There are three primary advantages to on-site inspection
for SLCM verification. First, the inspecting nation need no
longer rely exclusively on data provided by the host
government. Secondly, and as a corollary to the first, human
observation can offer a degree of confidence above and beyond
that afforded by automated means. No matter how high the
quality of imagery from photo-reconnaissance satellites, it
cannot provide a close-up view of the facility, nor obtain
the impression of capabilities that an on-site inspector may
obtain. One should never underestimate the value of the human
senses in developing an impression regarding compliance.
Although governments may not charge a violation based on
"impressions" alone, they may provide useful "clues" for
further investigation.
Lastly, challenge inspections can deter cheating on a SLCM
agreement. The possibility, even though small, that a
challenge inspection may uncover a "smoking gun," may have a
high deterrent value against the side that contemplates
cheating. (Shearer, 1984, p. 29)
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Another minor advantage to on-site inspections is that
they are less expensive to run, for the amount of data
returned, than other verification methods, particularly
national technical means. On-site inspections may also
preclude the implementation of complicated and extensive
procedures to make verification by national technical means
possible. (Shearer, 1984, p. 29)
The greatest potential drawback to on-site inspection is
the possibility that on-site inspection locations may draw
concentrated effort at maskirovka (Harris, 1987, p. 187).
Maskirovka has been variously defined in Western literature,
but succinctly defined, it is "the art of masking by means of
denial and deception activities" (Harris, 1987, p. 186) .
While it may sound counter-intuitive to expect maskirovka
activity during an on-site inspection, one must remember that
arms control treaties cover specific weapons systems. In the
attempt to verify compliance with those treaties, the
intelligence community generally, and the on-site inspectors
particularly, may become (overly) focused on the covered
systems to the neglect of other requirements. Maskirovka
activities may or may not be conducted in regard to treaty
limited systems, however, maskirovka activity regarding non-
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covered systems may provide adequate cover and deception for
some other military capability.
Another OSI drawback may be that the resources expended
for, and emphasis placed upon, this method may draw time and
effort away from other methods of intelligence data collection
used in the verification process. In particular, the
requirement for photo-reconnaissance satellite imagery of the
inspected facilities may be down-graded in importance. There
may be the temptation to conclude that since a site is already
being observed by inspectors on the ground, the highly
valuable imaging time of a satellite transiting over the
Soviet Union should be used for other, non-observed sites.
Imagery taken during an inspection, however, may be the sole
means of determining what has changed at that site for the
inspection team's visit, and thus may be the sole means to
detect maskirovka activity.
The final drawback to on-site inspection is that a limited
number of challenge inspections constrains the ability to
confidently verify the treaty's provisions, particularly in
the case of SLCMs . As discussed above, imaging systems may
be able to detect possible production facilities which appear
to violate the treaty, but without challenge inspections,
little may be done to alter the situation.
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There is, moreover, an argument opposing the concept of
challenge OSI . This argument turns on the concern that,
challenge OSI being reciprocal, it could be used for improper
intelligence purposes, particularly by the Soviet Union's
inspectors in the United States. Facilities which are
obviously not engaged in the operational life of a SLCM could
be challenged, possibly opening the door to an intelligence
coup. The Soviets could, for example, challenge that Electric
Boat Company, in its Groton, Connecticut covered construction
hall, was covertly producing SLCMs and storing them aboard
new-construction submarines. Such a challenge would send
nervous shudders throughout the Navy. Certainly, without some
method of vetoing challenges, and possibly even with such a
veto, the stage could be set for challenge inspections to
become intelligence gathering, rather than verification,
missions
.
Additionally, most, if not all, defense research and
weapons production in the United States is contracted out to
private firms, so that challenge inspections could raise
complicated legal questions over corporate privacy and
proprietary rights. Challenge inspections cannot be permitted
to interfere with the rights of individual or corporate
privacy enjoyed by Americans and American businesses. The
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government's right to demand access to private corporate
facilities is very limited, and most likely would have to be
agreed to contractually. This is not a simple issue, although
it has received virtually no coverage in verification
literature
.
What OSI can provide is deterrence to ensure compliance.
Even if the host nation engages in maskirovka activity, its
country's leadership can never be certain that the whole
maskirovka curtain will not come unravelled, exposing their
non-compliance, not only to the inspecting party, but also to
the world. Secondly, OSI allows the inspecting party to be
responsible for its own data collection without having to rely
upon the good faith (and data) of the party being inspected.
D. PERIMETER PORTAL MONITORING
The final verification method which has been advocated as
a method of maintaining a reliable count on SLCM inventory is
perimeter portal monitorings (PPMs). PPM "involves setting
up inspection stations at the perimeters of facilities which
are ^choke points' in the path a weapon follows from
production to deployment " (Harvey and Ride, 1988, p. 5) .
Ideally, the goal is to monitor the flow of each weapon as it
transits between each stage in its operational life, from
production to destruction. Such monitoring would allow --
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assuming the accuracy of the baseline data -- an accounting
of all the numbers of weapons in a SLCM inventory at any time.
Thus, PPM could be a highly effective verification method if
a treaty only limited the total number of SLCMs permitted to
each side.
To achieve this high confidence level, perimeter
monitorings would have to be continuous, 24 hours a day, 365
days a year, at the entrances and exits of all the "choke
points." To do otherwise would be to introduce the
possibility of error, since during the non-monitored times,
missiles could be moved from one location to another or
unaccounted missiles deployed. The greatest advantage of the
PPM concept is that it allows the inspectors to keep an
accounting on all the legal SLCM storage and production rates
without being too intrusive. PPMs do not require the
inspectors to enter into any of the missile facilities but
only to intercept the movement of weapons in and out of those
facilities. In this respect, PPM may be considered a
"passive" verification procedure in the sense that it cannot
verify anything unless the host country moves one of its
missiles
.
A second advantage of perimeter monitorings is that if a
nation wanted to obtain a covert supply of SLCMs, it would be
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required to create an entirely new set of facilities to cover
the operational life cycle requirements of the covert
missiles. The creation of these new facilities would not be
an inexpensive operation. Its cost would be justified,
however, if the national leadership believed the risk of
detection was low and the additional military capability
provided by the covertly produced SLCMs high.
Of course, the inspecting nation must constantly guard
against the possibility of a covert production, storage, and
deployment path. The inspectors do have one advantage in this
regard, though. In a PPM verification regime, the inspecting
nation already has available knowledge of what the operational
life cycle of the missiles entails and an appreciation of the
types of facilities used in that cycle. Knowing, as discussed
above, that military organizations tend towards uniformity in
their operations, a secondary, illegitimate SLCM production
facility can reasonably be expected to resemble the legitimate
original. Thus, a search process for covert SLCM facilities
may be narrowed down to sites whose activities closely
resemble the allowed SLCM facility.
One final advantage of PPMs is a national security
consideration. With this method of verification, inspections
aboard ships are not required to maintain the inventory data
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base. Although naval facilities themselves would be candidate
PPM sites, no individual ships need be inspected. Once a
missile entered a naval facility, it could be considered
"deployed, " regardless of whether or not it was actually
placed aboard a ship. Such perimeter monitorings would
preserve the American commitment neither to confirm nor to
deny the presence of a nuclear weapon aboard a ship.
The greatest drawback to PPM is a consequence of its great
advantage: the requirement for continuous monitorings. It
has been shown how continuous monitoring is necessary to
ensure that no covert missiles are produced or transferred
from one location to another. All shipments going into or
departing from these facilities, some of which serve a
multitude of purposes, would be subject to inspections.
Again, as with on-site inspections, there is the problem of
the inspectors having access to non-treaty controlled items.
There is no easy answer to this dilemma of preserving one's
military security while still allowing perimeter portal
monitorings in the search for transiting SLCMs
.
For compliance purposes, continuous PPMs could provide a
strong deterrent against cheating and covert production. Not
only would it be difficult and costly to establish a second
production-to-destruction cycle, but one would also constantly
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risk exposure and opprobrium in return for a limited gain in
military capability. Also, the fact that the more extensive
the violation, the greater the likelihood of being discovered,
must occur to the national leadership before ordering the
covert production of SLCMs . Thus, perimeter portal
monitorings may provide a high degree of deterrence against
cheating because, if used in conjunction with the broad search
capabilities of photo-reconnaissance satellites, they offer
a high probability of detection.
The four preceding verification methods, namely, national
technical means, data exchanges, on-site inspections, and
perimeter portal monitorings, have been proposed in the
attempt to solve the problem of accounting for the total
number of missiles in a treaty-controlled SLCM inventory.
These methods emphasize the total number of SLCMs available
and do not attempt to distinguish between individual varieties
of missiles. To verify a qualitative , i.e., nuclear armed
SLCM inventory sub-ceiling, it is necessary to be able to
identify the particular warhead type carried on each
individual missile. Two verification methods have been
proposed to solve the problem of distinguishing between the
conventional and nuclear variants of sea-launched cruise




The primary purpose of the tag identification method is
to distinguish the conventional and nuclear variants of SLCM.
To be effective, the tags must be tamper-proof, unduplicable,
environmentally stable, and not interfere with the operational
capabilities of the missile (Leggett and Lewis, 1988, p. 422;
Harvey and Ride, 1988, p 5) .
Proposed methods of tagging SLCMs have been categorized
as either "passive" or "active." Passive tags "do not produce
their own identification, " but require an inspector to use
some proactive device to obtain the identification. "^Active'
tags provide their own identification," and require only that
the inspector read the information from the tag which can then
be correlated to the identification of a specific missile.
(Leggett and Lewis, 1988, p. 422) Two candidate tagging
options, one passive and involving the use of metal flake
paints, and the other active through the use of an electronic
code box, are discussed below.
The passive tag identification method proposes to use
metal fleck paints and photomicrography techniques. Each
missile would have painted on it a small area with imbedded
"glitter" particles, the "glitter" being the imbedded metal
flakes. The missile and tag are then photographed under a
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number of lighting variations, so that the recorded glitter
reflections provide a unique identification for that missile.
Warhead information on each missile would have to be provided,
or determined independently, and associated with the tag
identification. During subsequent inspections, the tag would
be re-photographed. When the new photographs are compared
with the originals, any variations will supposedly be
detected. Detected tag anomalies could be an indication of
attempts to modify that missile. Since a specific warhead
would be associated with specific tags, an inventory record
of nuclear armed SLCMs could be maintained. (Plyler interview,
1 February 1989)
.
The use of an electronic tag has also been proposed as an
active device in the verification of a sub-ceiling on nuclear
armed SLCMs. According to this scheme "each tag would
incorporate a unique, encrypted code so that a digital input
would produce in response a unique digital output known only
to the nation installing the tag . . . (Tsipis, April 1988,
p. 13) . Such a procedure would uniquely identify the missile
only to the inspecting nation. The encryption tag would be
unduplicable as well as tamper-proof; tampering would destroy
the tag, thus baring strong evidence of an attempt to deceive
the inspectors. Additionally, a destroyed tag might be
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regarded as an attempt to pass an illegal missile as a legal
one, providing further evidence of possible intent to deceive.
Both passive and active tagging methods could be installed as
the missiles pass through the first perimeter portal
monitoring location at the exit of the production facility.
One large advantage of a tagging regime such as the one
described above is that it could solve the problem of
nuclear/conventional warhead accountability without relying
upon actual access to the warhead. Of course, the type of
warhead on each missile would still have to be declared or
determined, and then verified, when the tag is applied, but
afterward no further access to the warhead would be required.
Periodic reconfirmation of the warhead type would deter
conversion of missiles from conventional to nuclear.
The argument against a tagging regime stems from the
belief that there is no such thing as a non-reproducible,
tamper-proof tag. The fear is that tags could be reproduced
to make excess missiles appear "legal," thereby providing the
nation in violation with an additional military capability.
To this author, however, such fears are unfounded. Even if
the tag were reproduced and attached to a non-legal SLCM, a
reliable and accurate inventory accounting procedure would
rapidly identify the discrepancy in the inventory totals. A
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nation wanting to have a covert SLCM capacity would want to
hide these weapons, not bring them to the inspectors.
Tag identification methods can assist the inspector in
ensuring that the nuclear SLCM inventory in particular, and
the total SLCM inventory in general, do not exceed agreed
limits. While this capability is valid only for "legal"
SLCMs, the tagging process also helps deter illegal SLCM
production. This is so because any SLCM discovered external
to the production facility without a tag could be considered
an illegal missile and thus in violation of the treaty.
F. NUCLEAR MATERIAL DETECTION
The second proposed method of identifying nuclear SLCMs
involves the attempt to classify the warhead by the knowledge
and use of the physical properties of nuclear materials. As
with tags, active and passive methods of nuclear material
detection have been suggested in the open press:
Passive methods make use of the natural decay processes
characteristic of all radioactive materials. These decays
result in the emission of various nuclear radiations, but
only the neutral particles emitted will have a substantial
probability of being detected at some distance from the
radioactive material. (Gsponer, 1983, p. 210)
The two neutrally charged spontaneous emissions from nuclear
weapon materials are gamma rays and neutrons. Portable
81
devices to detect these two emissions have been produced
(Gsponer, 1983, p. 212) .
Active methods require the irradiation of the warhead with
neutrons or gamma ray beams to,
induce various nuclear reactions inside the fissile
material. The neutrons and gamma rays from the induced
reactions may then be recorded by detectors similar to
those used in the passive methods. (Gsponer, 1983, p. 213)
Another active method proposes the use of low-power x-rays
to irradiate the missile warheads. Unlike neutron or gamma
ray interrogation, the x-ray technique does not interact with
the nuclear material to produce an emission. Instead, this
method exploits the physical property whereby the absorption
of x-rays varies with the Z-value (i.e., the size of the
nucleus) of the material through which it passes. Thus, "x-
rays will be attenuated much more strongly by the high-Z
materials of a nuclear warhead than the low-Z ordinary high
explosives of a conventional warhead" (Tsipis, 1988, p. 50).
The primary concern in nuclear material detection is the
possible use of shielding to prevent detection of the
spontaneous nuclear emissions. "In principle, it is possible
to design shields that would easily make it impossible to
detect nuclear weapons of all kinds behind them, either by
active or passive methods" (Gsponer, 1983, p. 213) . There is
a cost one pays for such protection though, "... effective
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shielding can only be obtained by the addition of considerable
weight and volume" to the warhead assembly (Gsponer, 1983, p.
214) . Assuming a constant volume for the guidance and
propulsion components, any mass and volume dedicated to
shielding would penalize the mass and volume available for the
warhead. Whether this interplay can result in a shielded and
completely non-detectable nuclear armed SLCM remains an open
question
.
Additionally, either active or passive nuclear detection
may identify more about the warhead than just whether it is
nuclear or not. Gamma ray emission rates are characteristic
of the size and composition of the warhead. Active x-ray
procedures can detect the Z-value of a material precisely.
These detection capabilities may be used to identify the
composition of the nuclear warhead and thus its probable
yield. Consequently, nuclear detection methods could reveal
intelligence data above and beyond those required for treaty
adherence verification.
6. SEALS
The first four methods of verification discussed above are
concerned with identifying and verifying the total number of
SLCMs available to a nation. The next two methods are
concerned with identifying and verifying the types of warhead
83
carried by the SLCM, either conventional or nuclear. Finally,
"sealing" has been proposed as a verification technique for
preventing the conversion of a conventionally armed SLCM into
a nuclear armed one. (Harvey and Ride, 1988, p. 5)
The primary driving consideration behind seals is the fear
that a nation could "break-out" of an agreed sub-limit on
nuclear armed SLCMs by converting conventionally armed
missiles to nuclear armed ones. It has been suggested that
a seal could be applied to the missile at the first perimeter
portal monitoring site immediately following production as
part of the same inspection cycle when an identifying tag is
applied, and the warhead composition is confirmed by nuclear
detection techniques. Any seal must be proof against
conversion of the missile's warhead, but not be an
interference in the routine maintenance and transport of the
missile
.
Two approaches have been advanced to create a seal that
could meet these requirements. The first is the application
of a two-dimensional decal to the missile which would cover
the jointure between the warhead/nose cone and the body of the
missile. Imbedded metal flake glitter paints used in a manner
similar to the tagging scheme discussed above (Plyler
interview, 1 February 1989) and holograms (Harvey and Ride,
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1988, p. 5) have been suggested to fill this role. With
either of these seals, maintenance to the waihead could occur
through the use of an access panel. Attempting to covertly
replace one warhead with another, however, would break the
seal and thus indicate an attempted violation.
Another suggested seal device is the use of a "special
kind of fibre optic seal . The best seal would be a net
completely surrounding the missile, woven by a single strand
of optical fibre ..." (Tsipis, 1988, p. 50) . Again, the
goal would be to have the net arranged to allow the
maintenance of the missile, but to prevent replacement of the
warhead. Additionally,
somewhere along its length the [fibre optic] strand would
be integrally and inextricably connected to a photonic or
electronic microcircuit designed to receive a coded
digital input through the fibre. By means of a unique and
reprogrammable code contained within it, the microcircuit
would transform the input signal to a photonic digital
output identifying the particular net (Tsipis, 1988, p.
50) .
Thus, verification that the net has not been cut and the
warhead converted, becomes simply a matter of inputting a
signal into the fiber optic strand and receiving an output
back. If no output sianal is returned, then it would be known
that the strand had been broken in some way.
The advantage of both of these seal methods is their
sensitivity to any minor changes in the missile's physical
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configuration. Unfortunately, this sensitivity also makes
these seals vulnerable to the routine minor damage any weapon
may be expected to undergo during normal handling and
maintenance. A tightly woven fiber optic net around the
missile would be particularly vulnerable to damage. Even a
missile in a canister cannot escape the jostling of routine
transport or loading aboard a ship. Without a more durable
seal, the likelihood of a "false positive" is probably high.
A second advantage to a workable seal is that the seals
could be applied and monitored at the perimeter portal
monitoring facilities. As with the identifying tags, there
would be no need for inspectors to access ships, helping to
preserve, in the U.S. Navy's case, its NCND policy.
The largest drawback to a seal is that it may not be able
to prevent the use of insertable nuclear components to convert
the warhead of a SLCM from conventional to nuclear. As
discussed in Chapter IV, insertable nuclear components have
been proven feasible for a torpedo-sized weapon. Since access
to the missile must be allowed for maintenance purposes, it
may not be possible to ensure that such access would not also
permit the installation of a nuclear component.
Nevertheless, with the resolution of the problems of seal
sensitivity to damage and the use of insertable nuclear
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components, this verification methodology could become a
useful means for the prevention of warhead conversion on
SLCMs . The proposed seals do not require inspectors to access
to the warhead and may be applied at already established
perimeter portal monitoring sites, thus reducing the
"intrusiveness" of this method of verification.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the views of senior officers of
the United States Navy on why sea-launched cruise missiles
should not be included in the current strategic arms
negotiations. This argument is supported by three legs,
namely, (1) the military utility of the nuclear armed Tomahawk
SLCM, (2) the relationship between conventional and nuclear
variants of Tomahawk, and (3) the impossibility of adequately
verifying a SLCM agreement. In this argument, Tomahawk is
militarily useful across a range of tactical to strategic
missions. Strategically, SLCMs are believed to add to
deterrence by distributing nuclear delivery systems among a
wide range of platforms. In the NATO theater, SLCMs are
viewed as a valuable link in the strategy of flexible
response, possibly serving as a replacement for the now banned
ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II
intermediate range ballistic missile. On a tactical level,
it is argued that the combination of conventionally armed
Tomahawk and naval air striking power has "revolutionized" war
at sea.
The physical similarities between the Tomahawk variants,
whether land attack or anti-ship, nuclear or conventional, has
also been used in arguing against SLCM arms control. Since
proponents of this argument have assumed that conventionally
armed SLCMs should (or must) not be included in "strategic"
arms control negotiations, the indistinguishability between
the conventionally and nucDear armed SLCM variants renders any
nuclear SLCM accounting scheme useless, and thus an agreement
unverifiable
.
But the indistinguishability issue is not the
sole verification problem. Additionally, proponents have
argued that the missile's size and its ease of manufacture
could allow for the covert production and storage of excess
SLCMs and that one cannot ensure that conventionally armed
missiles are not converted to nuclear armed ones.
From a technological standpoint, however, this anti-
verification argument is weak. The author has presented above
seven different verification methods which address the Navy's
verification concerns. Although none of the different
verification routines and methods discussed in this paper is
sufficient by itself to guarantee a "cheat-proof" SLCM
agreement, in combination they can offer a synergistic,
mutually supportive, high-confidence verification regime.
Even if the verification routines mentioned in this paper are
89
not acceptable to the American arms control community, other
routines have been suggested in the verification literature.
Essentially, the SLCM verification question is a technical
problem, and a solvable one.
Of course, there are political aspects to verification,
too. The answer to the question of what comprises "adequate
verification" is reached at the highest level of the American
government, between the President and the Senate. If one is
from the "substantive" school of verification, a verification
regime probably can be readily achieved. Conversely, if one
adheres to the "legalistic" school, then a satisfactory
verification regime may be impossible. Regardless of where
one stands on this issue, the decision on verifiability is
ultimately a political one that will be made in a political
context, encompassing a wide range of political issues that
may or may not have a direct relationship to national security
policy. When, and if, the President outlines his vision of
adequate verification, and if that view is accepted by the
Senate, then the Navy might be forced into SLCM limitations.
To preclude this situation, the Navy's leadership must
continue to stress the military , including strategic, theater
and tactical value of both conventional and especially nuclear
SLCMs while more deeply analyzina in what manner Tomahawk, and
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its carrying platforms, would execute these missions.
Although the statement that by constituting "a flexible,
mobile system, dispersed throughout the world's oceans, SLCMs
defeat Soviet targeting in advance, " thus providing "a
credible and significant component of nuclear deterrence"
(Mustin, 1989, p. 186) may read well on the pages of
International Security , there are grave issues which must be
addressed before this statement can truly become an
operational reality.
For example, if one places a nuclear armed Tomahawk in the
nuclear reserve force, "that part of our nuclear forces
designed to be withheld to deter a follow-on attack against
the United States and its allies" (Brooks, 1989, p. 171), one
must answer the question of how that unit which is carrying
that Tomahawk will be operationally employed. Under whose
operational control will that ship or submarine operate during
the time its missiles are within range of the Soviet Union?
Will she have to go to sea on "alert," similar to ballistic
missile submarines? What effect will such a policy have on
the operational flexibility of the ship, both in regard to
other missions and especially the "neither confirm nor deny"
policy? If a ship goes on deployment as an identified
component of the strategic nuclear reserve, the NCND policy
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will have been violated. A parallel set of questions must
also be asked and answered if Tomahawk is to be utilized as
a NATO replacement for the "Euromissiles .
"
In conclusion, verification of limitations on sea-launched
cruise missiles has both political and technical components.
Politically, the question of verifiability is likely to be
decided on grounds other than purely "technical" ones. From
another standpoint, maintaining a SLCM inventory account,
distinguishing between conventionally and nuclear armed
SLCMs, and preventing the conversion of conventional to
nuclear warheads is probably technologically feasible. If the
Navy wants to prevent limitations on its planned sea-launched
cruise missile inventory, then it should downplay its
arguments against the verifiability of a SLCM agreement, a
decision which it alone cannot control. It ought to
concentrate its efforts instead on emphasizing the weapon's
contribution to the Nation's national security.
92
LIST OF REFERENCES
Allison, G.T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis , Little, Brown and Company, 1971.
Betts, R.K., ed., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy,
Politics , The Brookings Institution, 1981.
Betts, R.K., Cruise Missiles and U. S. Policy , The Brookings
Institution, 1982.
Biddle, W., "Amid Congress Debate, Navy Gets Cruise Missiles,"
New York Times
, p. A10, 28 June 1984.
Biddle, W., "Senate Defeats a Proposal to Ban Sea-Based
Nuclear Cruise Missiles," New York Times
, p. Al, 20 June 1984.
Blacker, CD. and Duffy, G., eds, International Arms Control:
Issues and Agreements , 2d ed., Stanford University Press,
1984.




Breemer, J.S., "Submarine Missile Developments, 1947-1962,"
Navy International , v. 90, pp. 171 - 179, March 1985.
Brennan, D.G., ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National
Security , George Braziller, Inc., 1961.
Brooks, L., "Nuclear SLCMs Add to Deterrence and Security,"
International Security , v. 13, pp. 169-174, Winter 1988/1989.
Buchan, G.C., "The Verification Spectrum," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists , v. 39, pp. 16-19, November 1983.
Burroughs, W.E., Deep Black: Space Espionage and National
Security , Random House, Inc., 1986.
Couhat, J.L. and Prezelin, B., Combat Fleets of the World,
1988/1989: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament , Translated
by A.D. Baker, Naval Institute Press, 1988.
93
Dallin, A. and others, The Soviet Union and Disarmament: An
Appraisal of Soviet Attitudes and Intentions , Frederick A.
Praeger, 1964.
Enthoven, A.C., and Smith, K.W., How Much is Enough? Shaping
the Defense Program, 1961 - 1969 , Harper & Row, Publishers,
1971.
"Excerpts from U.S. - Soviet Declaration: ^Considerable
Progress on Arms,'" New York Times , p. A10, 12 December 1987.
Freedman, L., "The First Two Generations of Nuclear
Strategists," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to
the Nuclear Age , P. Paret, ed., Princeton University Press,
1986.
Gordon, M.R., "Soviet Said to Harden Stance on Missiles," New
York Times
, p. A3, 14 February 1988.
Gottemoeller, R.E., "Finding Solutions to SLCM Arms Control
Problems," International Security , v. 13, pp. 175 - 183,
Winter 1988/1989.
Gottemoeller, R.E., Land Attack Cruise Missile , International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1987/1988.
Gsponer, A., "Technical feasibility of the detection of
nuclear weapons," Nuclear Disengagement in Europe , S. Lodgaard
and M. Thee, eds
.
, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute and Pugwash Conferences on Science and World
Affairs, Taylor and Francis, Inc., 1983.
Harris, W.R., "Soviet Maskirovka and Arms Control
Verification," Soviet Strategic Deception , B.D. Dailey and
P.J. Parker, eds., Lexington Books and the Hoover Institution
Press, 1987
Harvey, J. and Ride, S., Potential Verification Provisions for
Long-Range, Nuclear-Armed Sea Launched Cruise Missiles ,
Stanford University, 1988.
Hildreth, S.A., Tinajero, A., and Woolf , A., START: A Current
Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Positions , Congressional
Research Service, 3 June 1988.
Hill, J.R., Arms Control At Sea , Naval Institute Press, 1989.
94
Huisken, R., The Cruise Missile and Arms Control , The
Australian National University, 1980.
Interview between C. Plyler, Commander, USN, Center for Naval
Analyses, Alexandria, VA, and the author, 1 February, 1989.
Jasani, B., "Satellite Monitoring -- Programmes and
Prospects," Satellites for Arms Control and Crisis Monitoring
,
Jasani, B. and Sakata, T., eds
.
, Oxford University Press,
1987.
Johnson, P.G., "Tomahawk: The Implications of a Strategic /
Tactical Mix," United States Naval Institute Proceedings , v.
108, pp. 28-33, April 1982.
Krass, A.S., Verification: How Much is Enough? , D.C. Heath
and Company, 1985.
Larson, T.B., Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 1964 - 1968
,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.
Lefever, E.W., ed . , Arms and Arms Control , Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1962.
Leggett, J.K. and Lewis, P.M., "Verifying a START Agreement:
Impact of INF Precedents," Survival , v. 30, pp. 409-428,
September/October, 1988.
Mustin, H.C., "The Sea-Launched Cruise Missile: More Than a
Bargaining Chip," International Security , v. 13, pp. 184-190,
Winter 1988/1989.




Polmar, N. and Kerr, D.M., "Nuclear Torpedoes," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings , v. 112, pp. 62-68, August 1986.
Postol, T.A., "Banning Nuclear SLCMs : It Would Be Nice If We
Could," International Security , v. 13, pp. 191-202, Winter
1988/1989.
Potyarkin, Ye. and Kortunov, S., The U.S.S.R. Proposes
Disarmament (1920s - 1980s) , Progress Publishers, 1986.
95
Shearer, R.L., Jr., On-Site Inspections for Arms Control:
Breaking the Verification Barrier , National Defense
University, 1984.
Simpson, M.D., "The Soviet Push for Naval Arms Control: A
Strategic Appraisal," unpublished paper, Washington, D.C.,
1988.
Slocombe, W., "Verification and Negotiation," The Nuclear
Weapons Freeze and Arms Control , Proceedings of a symposium
held at the American Academy of Arts and Science, Harvard
University, 1983.
"South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty," Survival , v. 29, pp.
262-268, May/June 1987.
Spurlock, M.J., "A Soviet Framework for Arms Control
Verification, " unpublished paper for the Foreign Systems
Research Center by Science Applications, Inc., Greenwood
Village, CO, 1985.
Timerbayev, R.M., "A Soviet Official on Verification,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , v . 4 3, pp . 8-10,
January/February, 1987.
Timerbayev, R.M., Verification of Arms Limitation and
Disarmament , JPRS-URS-84-014-L, 5 November 1984, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service translation of Kontrol' Za
Ogranicheniyem Voorusheniy I Razoruzheniyem , Mezhdunarodnyye
Otnosheniya, 1983.
Trost, C.A.H., "The Soviet Naval Arms Control Offensive: Cut
the Cards - Watch the Dealer," Vital Speeches , v. 54, pp. 421-
424, 1 May 1988.
Tsipis, K., "Arms Control Verification at Sea: Cruise
Missiles," Naval Forces , v. 9., pp. 42-52, 1988.
Tsipis, K., "Verification of Nuclear Cruise Missiles,"
unpublished paper, Cambridge, MA, April 1988.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Verification
:
The Critical Element of Arms Control
,
Government Printing Office, 1976.
96
United States Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat, 1988 , Government Printing Office,
1988.
United States Department of State, United States Treaties and
Other International Agreements , Government Printing Office,
1972.
Vigor, P.H., The Soviet View of Disarmament , St. Martin's
Press, 1986.
Werrell, K.P., The Evolution of the Cruise Missile , Air
University Press, 1985.
Yost, D.S., "How to Control SLCM, " unpublished paper, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 16 August 1988.
Zumwalt, E.R., On Watch: A Memoir , Quadrangle Books, 1976.
97
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barnet, R.J., Who Wants Disarmament? , Beacon Books, 1960.
DeSutter, R.J., "Intelligence Versus Verification:
Distinctions, Confusion and Consequences," Intelligence
:
Policy and Processes , A.C. Maurer, M.D. Tunstall and J.M.
Keagle, eds
.
, Westview Press, 1985.
Kartchner, K.M., Soviet Interests in Strategic Arms
Reductions, 1981 - 1983 , Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 1987.
Katz, A.H., "The Fabric of Verification: The Warp and the








Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1984.
Krepon, M., "Verification of Conventional Arms Reductions,"
Survival , v. 30, pp. 544-555, November/December, 1988.
Ranger, R., "Learning from the Naval Arms Control Experience,"
The Washington Quarterly , v. 10, pp. 47-58, Summer 1987.
Sapolsky, H.M., The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic
and Programmatic Success in Government , Harvard University
Press, 1972.
Terriff, T., "Controlling Nuclear SLCM, " Survival , v. 31, pp.
52-69, January/February 1989.
Tsipis, K. and others, eds., Arms Control Verification: The
Technigues That Make It Possible , Pergamon-Brassey's
International Defense Publishers, 1986.
United States Department of State, Security and Arms Control:




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. Office of the Secretary of Defense 5
Director of Net Assessment
Room 3A930, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20501
4. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 1
International Security Policy/Strategic Forces Policy
Attn: Mr. Ken Ward
Room 4B880, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2600
5. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 1
International Security Policy/Verification Policy
Attn: LCDR C. L. Hanson
Room 1E760, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2600
6. Department of the Navy 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/OP-60
Attn: RADM Ronald Eytchison




Department of the Navy 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/OP-65
Attn: RADM William P. Houley




Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/OP-65
Attn: CAPT Forrest Horton
Room 4D562, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350
9 Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/OP-603
Attn: CDR R.M. Brown
Room 4E586, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350
10. Director, CNO Strategic Think Tank
Attn: CDR Conrad Plyler
4 4 01 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22302
11. Department of the Navy
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations/OP-OOK
Director, CNO Executive Panel Staff
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22302-0268
12. Center for Naval Analyses
Attn: LT Nancy K. Jenkins
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22302
13. Naval Technical Intelligence Center
Attn: Mr. Peter Findlay/Code DA/SDO
4301 Suitland Road
Washington, D.C. 20395-5020
14. Naval Operational Intelligence Center
Attn: Ms. Maria Jordan/Code 03
4301 Suitland Road
Washington, D.C. 20395-5001




16. Defense Nuclear Agency




17. Dr. Donald C. Daniel
Chairman, Campaign and Strategy Department
Center for Naval Warfare Studies
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02841-5010




19. Dr. Roger W. Barnett
National Security Research, Inc.
3031 Javier Road, Suite 300
Fairfax, VA 22031-4662
20. Chairman, Code 56
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
21. Prof. Donald Abenheim, Code 56Ah
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
22. Prof. Jan S. Breemer, Code 56Be
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
23. Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, Code 56Gt
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
24. Prof. Kerry M. Kartchner, Code 56Kn
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
25. Prof. David Yost, Code 56Yo




26. LT Arthur Capron, USN
762 Dragoon Drive
Mt . Pleasant, SC 29464
27. Commanding Officer
Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility,
Western Pacific
F.P.O. Seattle, WA 98768-1808
Attn: LT Robin K. Myers
102


•Thesis
M994C3
c.l
Myers
Political and' technical
verificatioj^issues of
limitation's on
sea-launched cruise
missives.

